For a long time, Hungary has been known for its quick and promising development of stable democratic institutions that made it a reference country in the CEE region during the1990s and the early 2000s. However, a series of economic crises threw light on the effi ciency defects of the operations of the Hungarian public administration emerging in the late 2000s. Th us a new series of structural and operational reforms was launched recently, inspired by the current stern economic times. Th ese reform steps can be briefl y characterized by the labels of concentration and centralization aff ecting the entire corpus of administration. In practical terms, Hungary makes an attempt to adapt to the current economic conditions via increasing effi ciency and via more eff ective coordination while trying to conserve the achievements of the transition period. Th e article briefl y introduces the major changes so far and off ers a rationale to understand the motives of the reform. Th e article examines these questions based on empirical data and research.
Introduction

Ambition of the article
Th is article is about the currently ongoing public-administrative reform in Hungary that can be labeled with the name of the basic reform document issued in 2011: the "Magyary Program" with special regard to agencies. Th e program itself contains many administrative reform steps discussed in this article, but there are other signifi cant reform elements practically implied but not incorporated into the text of the program. Th e ambition of the article is to provide a rationale to understand the reform steps in the context of the ongoing economic crisis.
Brief historical context
For a long time, Hungary has been known as the "best student" of the Westerntype democracy and capitalism in the post-communist bloc. Democratic transition was marked by a vast rule of law (e.g. Sólyom 2003 ) and public institutional development (Neshkova and Konstandinova 2012, 326.) . Public-administrative and general institutional changes took place in the context of rapid economic liberalization (Kornai 2006) and profound democratization of the entire society (Haerpfer 2006) . Th e transition, however, could not be complete due to the lack of a (historically) signifi cant timeframe. In this sense Kornai argues that the changes were "exceptionally speedy" (Kornai 2006, 223) in Hungary and in the entire region. With the perspective of more than two decades of the system change, the given historic time of the Western model societies also appears to be a decisive factor of the longterm characteristics of local transitions. Given the exceptionally long, steady growth period and dynamics of the "roaring nineties" (Stiglitz 2003) , the model societies appeared even more desirable and more fl awless than they in fact were. Transition countries including Hungary were not prepared for any systemic problems of the Western model, thus their adaptation technique was optimized more with regard to the general pace of change and to quick wins rather than to critical adaptation. Th e necessity of constructive criticism was enhanced by certain international authors, but their voice was hardly heard. I. Ayres and J. Braithwithe underpinned the signifi cance of well-functioning legal instruments as well as the importance of publicadministrative institutions. (Ayres and Braithwithe 1992, 7 .) Such instruments and institutions are inevitable for corrections of the development path when it becomes necessary.
As times changed and the economic crisis erupted in 2008, Hungary found itself in a situation where the internal challenges of the still ongoing transition and the sudden, vast external challenges merged and created a "wicked" (Ferlie et al. 2011) , multi-faceted crisis.
Theoretical patterns of solutions for increasing effi ciency in stern economic times
Hungary is an EU member state that has been constantly under extensive defi cit procedure since its accession in 2004. Due to its fi scal diffi culties, Hungary signed a standby agreement with the IMF in November 2008. Th ese are the primary circumstances that handcuff Hungarian reformers of public administration.
solutions that off er fi scal gains and a generally crisis-proof way of maintaining the entire public sector ?
In this chapter, we analyze the available solutions from a fi scal perspective since this approach is the most obvious one for the decision makers, and it off ers an analytical context to understanding the most vivid factor regarding the reform design. We also add some remarks on politics since political preferences were attributed to certain reform elements -especially to PPPs.
Model 1: New Public Management recipe
During 2002 -2006, vast NPM-inspired reforms took place in Hungary: outsourcing and PPPs were viewed as the panacea for austerity and effi ciency increase at the same time. A long chain of PPP university campus building / operating projects, PPP motorway projects, privatized public-health laboratories, PPP prisons and many others were launched within a few years. Th e NPM wave peaked when the government decided to privatize the public-health sector. Th is schedule was put down when a referendum halted the process in 2008; the result of the referendum led to the break-up of the coalition. Th ere are signs that the primary rationale of the PPP campaign was the illusion that PPPs would not increase the state defi cit. PPPs seemed to off er a bridging solution between development needs and fi scal possibilities in the short run. In 2005 and in 2006, however, Eurostat pointed out that PPP expenses have to be added to general state expenditures.
Th eoretically (for the sake of argument), the pro-NPM path could be further developed. With pure economic logic, borrowing costs for PPPs must be higher than state fi nancing under the circumstances of the economic crisis. Hungarian 10-year bonds are sold at an 8 -9 % interest rate on the Hungarian Forint. In case of partial government insolvency, the likelihood of not paying for PPPs is higher than not paying for bonds, thus the price of PPP fi nancing must be higher than distributive fi nancing. (In fact, knowing the prices on the Hungarian credit market, such projects could be fi nanced at around a 14 % interest rate on the Hungarian Forint when Forint bonds are issued at an 8 % interest rate.) Th is argumentation does not aff ect the debate whether other sources of effi ciency can counterbalance fi nancing costs or not. However, the fi scal crisis overburdens policy decisions with short-term fi nancial considerations that ban any further planning if there is any hint of the fi scal balance being aff ected. It is also true that "PPP" was very much attributed to the 2002 -2008 socialist-liberal government as a political buzzword..
Model 2: Governance Model recipe
In case of a mature civil society, certain public-sector functions can be delegated to social partners. It might have a certain effi ciency advantage to increase the proportion of various actors in governance as a common activity mix. As Éva Kuti pointed out, the Hungarian civil sector is far from being in a developed status, and it largely depends on state fi nancing. (Kuti 2011) Even though there are viable examples of cooperation (especially in social policy and in public education), the predominant state fi nancing of the civil sector precludes signifi cant effi ciency increase of the public sector. Apart from the fi nancing diffi culties, the governance model requires additional controlling and coordination eff orts from the central government.
Under the conditions of the economic crisis, the governance model can hardly contribute to successful adaptation due to the civil sector's dependence on government fi nancing. Th ere ought to be a government policy, however, to move the civil society to a more mature phase. Th ere are indeed such signals, e.g. increasing the role of chambers of commerce and industry. Such policies require signifi cant time while the fi scal crisis infl uences decision makers to seek short-term solutions. In the long run, governance-oriented reforms might still have a potential for increasing overall performance.
Model 3: Delegation of competencies
Delegation and decentralization of competencies are traditional organizational techniques of public-administration reforms. Th e issue of delegation and decentralization is widely considered to be a resource of effi ciency in public administration. Th e rationale of increasing effi ciency by delegation has basically two roots. Firstly, it stems from the idea of less political control involving higher professionalism (thus higher performance). Secondly, delegation is supported by the principal-agent theory whereas the separation of control and operations is the source of higher performance and effi ciency.
In public-administration theory there have been well established accounts against over-delegation as a problematic phenomenon aff ecting administrative effi ciency. According to Richard C. Box, "principal-agent theory is a myth" (Box 2004, 601 -602) . Fukuyama argues that delegation raises the issue of control and coordination since the agents tend to have their own priorities that are diff erent from what the principals might have in mind.˙ (Fukuyama 2004, 190) In the case of Hungary, the practical potential to seek effi ciency via more delegation was very limited. Delegation to local governments could not be a viable development path since the extremely complex system of nearly 3,200 local governments was not at all effi cient. Apart from their structural and procedural diffi culties, local governments face serious fi nancial burdens, as well, due to their extensive Swiss Franc and Euro indebtedness that is to be detailed later.
Delegation to agencies might also have a rational contribution to effi ciency, but the Hungarian public-administrative development path appeared to be relatively consistent in seeking economies of scale instead of seeking better division of labor. Th is will be detailed later in this article.
Model 4: Centralization and concentration of competencies
Th e terms "centralization" and "concentration" are diff erentiated here according to their realm of eff ect (this diff erentiation is common in the Hungarian PA research community). Centralization means re-locating responsibilities from the local governments to the central government. Th e term concentration is used for merging government organs within the central government.
Under the conditions of the economic crisis, centralization and concentration might have special (crisis-specifi c) advantages despite their unquestionable threats of contributing to citizen-unfriendly, rigid, ineffi cient bureaucracies. Centralization and concentration off er better coordination and control as well as effi ciencies of scale. Th ese aspects might gain additional value in a policy decision under the uncertainties and fi scal restraints of the crisis. According to the political aspect of the unfolding development path, a centralized and concentrated institutional system somewhat mirrors the monocentric political arena whereas the ruling political party has a 2 / 3 majority in the Parliament and also has an overwhelming majority in the municipal and county assemblies.
Th e chosen development path aff ects the allocation of duties (and resources) between the municipal and the central administration including the management of schools, hospitals as well as executing local authoritative tasks (e.g. building permissions). Concentration eff orts decrease the number of administrative organs and put the remaining ones under rigorous control. Agencies are defi nitely not favored in such an environment. When agencies are discussed regarding Hungary, basically two defi nitions are available. According to György Hajnal: "By 'agency' I refer to public administration organizations (i) directly subordinated to the Government (i.e., either the Cabinet or a ministry) and (ii) falling into the organizational scope of Law on Civil Service. " (Hajnal 2011, 7) In this sense, "agencies" are defi nitely not autonomous organizations. I suggest using a diff erent notion for agencies including entities having at least certain elements of autonomy. Such autonomous or quasiautonomous institutions are analyzed later.
Brief introduction to the Hungarian public-administration system
In order to facilitate further discussion regarding the currently ongoing reform, the basic characteristics of the Hungarian public-administration system are briefl y introduced.
Local level
In 1990, municipalities gained wide administrative competencies sealed with the constitutional and political power of elected assemblies and mayors. Municipal local governments and their apparatuses became the general public-administrative forum of fi rst instance with general competency. Th e level of autonomy of the municipal administrations is well refl ected by the mirror translation of the Hungarian expression "local self-government". Th e Act on local governments was a so-called cardinal law to be modifi ed only with a 2 / 3 majority in Parliament. Th is provided an extremely strong legal guarantee for the local-government system in the constitutional sense. In the meantime, their economic basis suff ered occasional damages, though, such as the loss of the re-circulated amount of personal-income-tax revenues or simply being addressees of public responsibilities without suffi cient financing.
Seated above the municipal level, the counties gradually lost their disposable revenues (dues), and despite having elected assemblies, they remained maintenance offi ces of county institutions such as theaters, secondary schools and local state archives in the last decade. In the case of the county assemblies, relatively strong democratic authorization was contrasted with a mostly insignifi cant administrative role.
Central public administration
Th e architecture of the central public administration can be divided into the ministerial and the territorial levels. Territorial administrative organs are controlled by the ministries. Central government organs have had a dynamic development path during the past two decades. Th eir legal status can be described as very diverse until 2010, when there were signifi cant eff orts in order to rationalize the structure and the system of government organs from 2006. Th is diversity embraces structural, procedural, fi nancial, human resource and legal dimensions, as well. Th e detailed history of the public-administrative organs of the central level exceeds the limits of this study but the magnitude of changes aff ecting the agencies can be visualized by Diagram 1.
Th e central administration -based on the ministries -followed the given political necessities of their time.
Th e Government makes its decisions as a council, mostly with consensus, exceptionally by voting. Th e decision-making process in the central administration typically contains three stages of consensus-building: 1. circulating the proposition among the ministries on the expert level, 2. the decision of the weekly session of the state secretaries for administrative aff airs (permanent secretaries), 3. session of the Government. Aft er the system change in 1990, the political and the professional dimensions of the ministries were strictly separated, the permanent state secretaries were heads of the apparatus, and they were -at least theoretically but in many cases also practically -not removed due to political changes. Th e relative independence of the civil service was replaced in 2006 when the position of permanent state secretaries was abolished; the original competencies of the permanent state secretaries were relocated to the position of political state secretaries, thus the entire central administrative system was put under political control.
Improving the systemic output of public administration
Th e last two decades allow suffi cient perspective to draw major conclusions regarding the shortcomings of the system. Th e following three highlights might appear somewhat arbitrary but certainly worth analyzing.
Increasing effi ciency, but what about effi cacy ?
Identifying decisive elements in such a complex system as the PA of a country might lead to questionable statements. Th e following analysis attempts to shed light on the connection of the following aspects:
1. decreasing fi nancial resources; 2. the legal system as a transmitter of authority and values; 3. policy results.
Using this approach, our question is the following: Are the currently undergoing reforms -that can be described as centralization and concentration -appropriate to improve the balance between resources used and results achieved ?
Financial pressure has proven an undoubtedly decisive driving force of PA reforms in Hungary. Th ere are at least three reasons why fi nancial motives are proper driving forces of reforms. First: restrictions, austerity measures appear to have a long-lasting and self-sustaining character; second: in the technical sense, it is relatively easy to implement austerity-based reforms. Additionally, fi nancial concerns oft en get such infl uential international advocates as the IMF for instance.
Th e entire public administration has been suff ering a lot from chronic underfi nance. Financing state debt -largely inherited from the old system -tended to absorb around 10 -14 % of annual state revenues. Of course, there are many other reasons for economic underperformance such as shock of the system change, decreasing population, rate of inactivity, general lack of economic competitiveness, etc. All of these factors added up to a fl ow of ever-intensifying budget restrictions. Th e almost permanent fi scal austerity initiated a constant drive for fi nancial efficiency. Hungarian fi scal austerity programs -not analyzed here in detail -appear to have a common aspect that is the contraction of public administration (the waves of such headcount-reduction measures are demonstrated by Diagram 1).
Diagram 1
Number of public administrative organs and the number of civil servants 1994 -2010 (Hazafi 2011 .
No data available for 2007.
Th e diagram demonstrates the tendency of sharp downsizing campaigns followed by inevitable corrections in terms of headcounts in order to maintain basic public-administrative functions -while the number of public-administrative organs is steadily decreasing. Th e tendency relies on the perception that merged institutions off er operational effi ciency gains. Th is perception lacks well-established empirical evidence on the systemic level, though. Such a permanently unpredictable system creates enormous adaptation costs on the side of the citizens but also within the public-administration system itself. Such mergers might support effi ciency on the institutional level but probably not on the systemic level. It can also be stated that the effi ciency gain might threaten effi cacy. Th is occurs because of the frequency of changes. During the lengthy processes of policy-planning and policy implementation, the probability of serious institutional changes is high, therefore these changes tend to have a paralyzing eff ect on many aspects of PA. Th e most aff ected fi elds are HR-planning, fi nancial-resource-planning, PA building facility-planning, but profound uncertainty causes enormous shortcomings on policy-management capability as well.
Diagram 2
Number of public-administrative organs and the number of civil servants -without the municipal (local-government) sector 1994 -2010. (Hazafi 2011) No data available for 2007.
Th e fi gure on civil servants in the public administration without the localgovernment sector (i.e. the central government organs and agencies) demonstrates a somewhat moderate volatility compared to Diagram 1. Paradoxically, the sharp reduction of the number of administrative organs between 2006 and 2008 was followed by a strong increase of headcounts in 2009. Th e loss of administrative capacity -because of the modifi cations of the administrative structure (mostly mergers of administrative organs) -appears to be compensated for by increasing headcounts. Th is demonstrates that short-term austerities tend to decrease effi ciency on the institutional level that might -in itself -contribute to further cost increase that is contrary to the aim of restrictions.
Naïve Rechtsstaat-legalism collides with the principle of resultoriented, fl exible public administration
Rechtsstaat culture is an inseparable attribute to Hungarian public administration (Hajnal 2008, 132.) . Th e Rechtsstaat culture is a positive factor and has been of high importance during the 1970s and 1980s, since it represented a higher standard compared to the Soviet-type legal culture and as such -within narrow barriers -off ered a certain alternative to the over-politicized operations of the Hungarian public administration.
Th e naïve Rechtsstaat culture's content can be compressed in the slogan: "whatever is not explicitly allowed by law -is illegal". Th is thinking deeply aff ects public-administrative practice and can be hardly counterbalanced by unifi ed interpretations of law supported by court decisions. Administrative courts could fi ll this gap if they existed. (Th e communist regime abolished administrative courts in 1949. Previously, these judicial forums off ered the necessary legal fl exibility for public administration -in a channeled but Rechtsstaat-friendly way. Th us during the communist period, the maimed Rechtsstaat culture mixed with the traditional irresponsiveness of Soviet-type public administration producing a really stiff , rigid combination. In the 1990s, this administrative attitude suddenly faced inexperienced challenges.)
As more changeable times came in the 1990s and 2000s, the social and economic pressure for more effi cacious and more fl exible public administration increased. Th e system reacted to this pressure in two ways: on the street level, a wave of contra-legem practices made everyday life bearable (Gajduschek 2008 , Hajnal 2008 ; on the macro level, the system reacted with a constantly increasing amount of regulations: mostly modifi cations of the previous regulations but creating new legal material as well. Th e result of the tension between vast socio-economic changes and the rigid Rechtsstaat culture can be visualized by the following diagram that displays the numeric parameters of newly issued legal material in Hungary between 1990 and 2010.
Diagram 3
Newly released law in Hungary 1990 -2010. Based on original research, empirical data provided by CompLex Publisher, Hungary
Diagram 3 summarizes the fi gures of newly released regulations in Hungary but excludes local-government decrees. It is to be underlined that applicable law contains new law, law already in force and in certain cases (for example in familylaw cases or in citizenship law) even law currently not in eff ect might be applicable. It is not only the pure amount of applicable law that causes the problem. It is also the increasing internal complexity and interrelatedness of law that makes it really diffi cult to apply and to fulfi ll. Th ere is a relatively simple internal parameter that can indicate the internal complexity of legal material: the number of references to other laws and regulations. In the case of the Hungarian Acts released in 2010, 185 newly released Acts contained 2053 references to other Acts, Government Decrees or Ministerial Decrees. Th is fi gure contrasts with the data of 1990, the year of the system change, when 104 new Acts were issued, and these contained 470 references altogether regarding other Acts, Government Decrees or Ministerial Decrees.
2 During the two decades, the average references per Act multiplied by 2.45 (from 4.51 to 11.09), at the same time newly released law contained 496 legal items in 1990 while in 2010 this fi gure was 1142. So there is an approx 2.5-fold multiplication in the content diff erentiation of legal materials and an approx. 2.5-fold multiplication in the gross fi gures of newly released law.
With such a high complexity and internal dynamism, it is really questionable how public administration can fulfi ll the criteria of the rule of law and effi ciency at the same time without losing eff ectiveness.
In fact, the phenomena of the two dimensions formulate a vicious circle of distrust between society and the public administration: the administration intensifi es regulatory scrutiny, increases sanctions and administrative burden, while the wide society experiences that public interest is not met by administrative eff ectiveness. On the contrary: everyday life is bogged down by strange, complicated and permanently changing regulations. Th is fuels law avoidance that causes even more rigorous regulations etc.
EU accession and the harmonization of domestic law to the acquis communitaire did not reduce the vicious circle of overregulation. Th e EU membership even intensifi ed it through initiating new regulatory regimes and via introducing even more scrutiny in implementing its policies such as common agriculture policy, for instance.
Role of agencies in the reform
Independent or quasi-independent public administrative bodies are not typical in the Hungarian public administration. In his cited study, Hajnal uses the term "agency" for covering all entities in the public administration beneath the ministerial level. (Hajnal 2011, 7) . If we defi ne "agencies" as holders of a certain level of independence (from the Government), in the Hungarian case we fi nd a few organizations that can be categorized as such:
• Hungarian branches of international or EU institutions (such as the Hungarian branch of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the National Development Agency that is in charge of allocating EU funds domestically -these are formally integrated into the domestic PA system, but they have a high de-facto independence);
• Background institutions of ministries without administrative authority -these are typically project-management or consultative institutions. State-owned companies can be placed in this category (Th e ownership of all state-owned companies belongs to the Ministry of National Development);
• In the narrow legal sense, Hungary has four agencies altogether. Th ese are defi ned by Act XLIII. 2010 ( §1) as autonomous government organs: the Public Procurement Authority, the Competition Authority, the Authority on Equal Opportunity, the Data Protection and Freedom of Information Authority;
• Administrative organizations subordinate to the Parliament (not to the Government): the Media Authority and the Financial Supervisory Authority.
Such a narrow limitation of agencies is a result of recent reforms. Nevertheless, the process of decreasing the number of administrative organs (as well as agencies) has been a constant development pattern since 2004 (see Diagram 2.) Th e centralization process aff ected state-owned companies as well (e.g. the Hungarian State Railways group was consolidated from more than 100 companies to around 20 in 5 years time). A certain, broad de-agencifi cation was carried out before the centralization campaign begun in 2010.
Th e reason behind the overall centralization path -apart from the economic (or rather: fi scal emergency) steps -is not yet fully discovered. According to Hajnal's fi ndings on the "extremely hectic" period of Hungarian PA, 40 % of the administrative organs and agencies were terminated in their fi rst year of existence between 2006 and 2010 (Hajnal 2011, 13 .) Th us the desire for general, structural stability might be one reason for the centralization. Th e second reason might have been the need to increase internal and external transparency that enables domestic control and provides better information for the international creditors. Th irdly, the hectic period of short-lived agencies and administrative organs refl ected the turbulence of the political arena (from the 2006 riots to the coalition break-up, the PM's resignation in 2009 and the minority Government) whereas short-term political deals determined the distribution of infl uence over agencies. Th e 2 / 3 majority government entered power in 2010 and began to re-arrange agencies and PA organs as well: monocentric politics appeared to require a centralized institutional subsystem.
Considerations on analyzed elements of the Hungarian PA development path
Th e implementations of fi scal stabilization packages on the domestic public administration were built on the idea that large systems -like the vast administrative apparatus of a country -always have a certain system-tolerance for austerity. Th e organization-theory concept of the pursuit for effi ciency was that "economies of scale" have the potential for real operational effi ciency gains. Th is meant that -according to the ruling stakeholder perception -fewer, bigger agencies lead to effi ciency gains. Contrary to this practice, theory would require internal effi ciency-improving reforms fi rst, and as a gain, fi nancial restrictions could be introduced aft erwards. On the other hand, it is trivial that bigger organizations are not necessarily better ones.
Legal considerations are of utmost, comprehensive importance for a rule-oflaw country. Legal stability, legal status, accounting and budgeting rules determine the output and capacities of administrative institutions. On the inter-institutional level, the most important factor is the level of autonomy granted to the agency that might unleash creative energies within the management in order to serve the public good while keeping transparency and accountability standards. Higher autonomy (such as the Hungarian local governments' autonomies, which were protected by a 2 / 3 majority law) could off er a higher local input but with the risk of losing central control and losing the grip on coordination ˙ (Fukuyama 2004) . Th e challenge is to fi nd and to sustain the "aurea mediocritas" between effi ciency gains locally and losing the control centrally.
Th e issue of delegation leads to the problem of systemic guarantees for overall effi cacy. Th e major challenge from the policy decision-making point of view is this: if administrative institutions (implicitly: agencies) are given high autonomy, it might add to their effi ciency on the local or institutional level, but how can they be eff ectively coordinated in order to maximize the desired eff ects of governancewhile fulfi lling the criteria of fi nancial rigor ?
Autonomous agencies have a marginal role in Hungary, their autonomy is either protected by international players or by the decision of the Parliament. Such decisions can also be decisively motivated by the international context. Independent authorities control the vitally important policies of media, fi nance, competition, freedom of information, human rights and public procurements. Some quasiindependent agencies still remain aft er the radical centralization wave. Th ese are mostly relatively insignifi cant or belong to well-protected sectoral interests.
The Hungarian path
Comprehensive reforms
When Hungary was hit by the international economic crisis in 2008, internal ineffi ciencies suddenly came to the surface. In order to avoid fi scal insolvency, Hungary signed a stand-by loan agreement with the IMF. According to the fi rst country report under the loan agreement 3 , the following structural reform steps -aff ecting public administration -were agreed upon:
• Reducing the government's fi nancial needs, • cost-cutting in central government, • taking steps to eliminate redundant transfers and subsidies provided by diff erent government levels, • encouraging local government to seek economies of scale by cutting central government transfers (in the 2010 budget), • reduction in the size of local councils.
As can be seen, the promise of effi ciency gains was not seen in granting more autonomy to local governments and government organs (as well as agencies) but in merging them. Neither was the potential for overall effi ciency gains identifi ed in increased policy control. Otherwise, the request of higher fi scal control upon the PA organs and on the local governments was incorporated into the IMF-Hungary cooperation but without any reference to overall policy control.
In the following, we analyze the question whether the reform steps are adequate for the most important internal shortcomings of the Hungarian publicadministrative system -under the conditions of the economic crisis. It can also be argued that the reforms are not results of any rational policy choice but rather consequences of emergency steps.
Ministries
Th e number of ministries between 1989 and 2010 varied around 14, but in 2010 their number was radically reduced to 8. Th e newly created grand ministries incorporate the competencies of earlier ministries. For instance, the Ministry of National Development embraces the following competencies: energy, transport, IT & telecommunications, state-asset management and allocation of EU funds. 4 Each of these fi elds are controlled by a thematic political state secretary in terms of policy content, but the civil service's human and fi nancial administrations are controlled by the non-politician administrative state secretary.
In 2010, the position of the permanent state secretary was re-established as head of the ministry apparatus, but policy content and the control of policy management remained under the thematic political state secretaries. Th us a decisive portion of policy coordination was re-located from the earlier PMO to the ministry level, but certain other parts of this activity were deployed to the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice (this new grand ministry absorbed competencies of the earlier PMO and of responsibilities of the Ministry of Justice) and partially to the Prime Minister's Cabinet.
Public administrative institutions of the central government
In 2010, the new Government, supported by a 2 / 3 majority in Parliament, began to change the settings of the system of the post-system change Hungarian public administration. Regarding public administration, the most spectacular step is the change of the government-organ system and later on the responsibilities of the local governments. Th e crucial issues of both changes are the level of autonomy and -due to the fi nancial conditions -the level of effi ciency.
A new government territorial institutional system was introduced in 2010 [288 / 2010. (XII. 12.) Gov. Decree]. Th e previous, diverse system was built on the sectoral logic, with the ministry at the top of each sector, having at least one agency of national competence, this agency having sub-agencies of county (or later: regional 5 ) competence.
Th e new system replaces the system based on sectorally integrated hierarchies with a more unifi ed system. Th e main elements of the system are as follows.
Th e new administrative architecture deploys operational coordination onto the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice while policy conduct remains at the line ministries. Th is creates a dual control between the unifi ed operational functions and the semi-coordinated policy functions. Nevertheless policy coordination does not have a single center; the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice has a certain secondary coordination function since part of the coordination burden was already relocated to the new grand ministries.
In the new system, the county-based agencies (County Government Offi ces) of the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice are responsible for the accounting, budgeting, staffi ng, legal monitoring, IT support and front offi ce service of the following sectoral fi elds (certain fi elds such as policing, revenue service and Treasury are excluded from the integration): According to the logic of this integration, effi ciency gains are expected from the economies of scale in institutional operations and from internally more transparent accounting and budgeting. On the clients' side, simpler and smoother service is expected from the integrated front offi ces (Government Windows).
Th e integration focuses on the operational effi ciency gains; the contents of the policies carried out by the integrated agencies are still determined by their line ministries.
The fi rst experience of integrated government offi ces
In the fi rst period of the integration, it turned out that local diff erences aff ected previous practices; in many cases the payments of the civil servants were not adjusted according to the payment standards, and in many cases accounting was not transparent. During the fi rst period of the integration, the following cost streams were reduced: rationalizing headcounts, accommodation of offi ces, unifi cation of car usage, telecommunications costs, joint purchasing of energy was arranged. Th e gains altogether added up to the approx. 12 % of the operational costs of the previous system.
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Apart from the obvious opportunity for effi ciency gains, there are certain issues that have to be addressed regarding the integrated system.
Could the old system have provided the effi ciency gains that were delivered by the integrated system ? Th e answer is probably yes, since there were numerous previous initiatives of homogenous IT policies, HR and accounting standards, but these initiatives were mostly hindered by the sectoral administrations since they successfully protected themselves from external forces throughout two decades. In the current case, the structural change appears to be decided by the Government partly to increase effi ciency and partly to carry out cost savings but also -to a certain extent -with the purpose to break down non-transparent sectoral and local polity resistance. Even more importantly: Does such loss of institutional independence strengthen or weaken policy-delivering capacity ? For the time being, this is diffi cult to answer since the reform does not have a signifi cant perspective in time yet for well-established refl ections. However, it can be stated that eff ectiveness improvement should be pursued even if it does not have such infl uential advocates as short term effi ciency gains have (such as IMF).
Eff ectiveness gains may be supported by enhanced policy-performance management. Th ere are promising steps in this direction, but they need further improvement. One step is the application of a renewed regulatory-impact-assessment (RIA) system supported by ECOSTAT (Agency for Statistics 7 ) and by the Centre of Public Policy (both agencies of the Ministry of PA and Justice). Th is system requires further development, though, with special attention to the RIA database that might become remarkable in a few years' time.
Centralization applied to local-governmental responsibilities
Th e Hungarian local-government system -as previously indicated -has been labeled ineffi cient by many observers and international organizations such as the OECD. On the other hand, the Hungarian local-government system, having high autonomy, fulfi lled the European Charter of Local Self-Government and prescriptions of utilizing local social energies. Th e high autonomy of the municipal sector used to contribute to short-term fi scal effi ciency since the local governments became bearers of tasks with insuffi cient central fi nancing. Such tasks disappeared from the budgetary agenda of the central government that has been under permanent fi nancial pressure. Since the municipalities have diverse resources for additional revenues, certain local governments could survive such Government measures in a fi nancially intact position. However, the unsustainable nature of allocating tasks without suffi cient fi nancing to the municipal sector backfi red: while in 2005 the gross debt of municipalities added up to 1.9 % of the GDP, in 2009 it was 4.1 %. (Vigvári 2011, 61.) Th e next step of the reform is to re-concentrate the majority of competencies from local-government offi ces to the newly established district administrations (townships). According to the ongoing reform, townships would be the local branches of the County Government Offi ces, and they would be responsible for all public-administrative issues that are currently delegated to the local governments. Th is will somewhat hollow out the local governments' administrative role since ap-prox. 75 % of their case load is aff ected by the reform. Th is involves that the systemic role of local governments has to be reconsidered for at least two reasons. Local governments have enormous voluntary tasks (maintaining secondary schools, etc.), and they have signifi cant "own" revenues. Since local identity is usually considerably strong in the Hungarian society, these factors should not be excluded from considering the next steps of the reform.
Th e re-centralization of municipal competencies appears to be in line with the OECD fi ndings of 2008, and it also has an impact on state fi nancing. Th e sharp increase of municipal indebtedness can be halted, and a new, transparent system can be elaborated regarding 75 % of the local governments' responsibilities. Transparency and closer control might be more acceptable for international state fi nancers than a complicated patchwork of local governments. On the other side of the coin: local control on local issues will certainly be weakened.
Regarding the lack of necessary fl exibility of the entire administrative system under the rule of law, the planned re-establishment of administrative courts is an undoubtedly benefi cial element of the reform. Th e importance of administrative courts is recognized by the new Constitution of 2011 (Article 25, paragraph 4); thus there is a solid legal basis to fi ll the highly important space between the natural rigidity of the Rechtsstaat system and the ever-changeable reality. According to the current plans, administrative courts will be re-established in 2013. Aft er a few years of operation, the rigidity of the norm-focused legal system can be expected to ease up due to appropriate court interpretations of law.
Conclusions
It is to be discussed whether the institutional re-concentrating reform -that is currently undergoing in Hungary -helps to meet the serious challenges of our time. In our analysis, we studied the following elements of adaptation to the crisis.
Financial concerns
Financial-effi ciency criteria appear to be convincingly fulfi lled -according to the fi rst experience. Around 12 % operational cost savings at the centralized, countybased government organs is a signifi cant gain -naturally, it is still a question whether it is enough. Due to the reform, international creditors can have a clear overview on this part of the Hungarian PA, and in the future, it will be easier for the Government to carry out further restrictions if necessary throughout the governmentcontrolled PA institutions.
In the case of the local governments, there might be serious fi nancial concerns regarding the local co-fi nancing of public services as well as the local voluntary contributions. GDP 4.1 % local-government (municipal) debt is undoubtedly worth talking about. With the reduction of local governments' importance, creditors' posi-tion for negotiating with either the local governments or with the Central Government is certainly not enhanced.
Legal system as a transmitter between resources and results
Due to the reforms, rule of law appears to be maintained -but hopefully with a more settled internal structure. Th e vast modifi cations of sectoral regulations might be consolidated. Furthermore, institutional diversity as a resource of varying interpretations of law appears to be decreased In 2013, Administrative Courts will begin their maintenance work on the machinery of the rigid legal system; thus its fl exibility is expected to improve gradually but signifi cantly, improving the quality and effi ciency of the operations of the entire PA.
The role of agencies
Agencies are defi nitely not the key players of the ongoing reform. Th eir overall number has been gradually reduced since 2004, and the relative independence of most of them vanished. Th e remaining ones are, however, extremely important, controlling key elements of the administration such as the media or the fi nancial sector. With these exceptions, the Hungarian PA development path can be an example of de-agencifi cation. Under the circumstances of the fi nancial (and economic) crisis, higher central control of fi nances and of policies appear to have higher value for the Hungarian decision makers than any potential gain on eff ective agency operations.
The democratic element of the reform
Re-concentrating PA institutions within the Central Government architecture does not raise concerns regarding democracy. In the case of local governments, democratic control and legitimacy is high in Hungary due to the strong democratic authorization of locally elected mayors and local assemblies. Th e current reform affects only those competencies of local governments that were delegated to them by unilateral decision of the Central Government; thus one can argue that delegation is a two-way-street. Concerning the democratic element of the reform, re-centralization of competencies does not necessarily decrease democracy (Peters 2009 ). In fact, via better transparency and accountability it might even enhance democratic control over public administration.
Without too lengthy a description of the past development path of Hungarian public administration -this job was nicely done by György Hajnal and György Jenei (Hajnal and Jenei 2008 ) -I would like to conclude that re-centralization and re-concentration appears to be an evident reply to the internal and external challenges presented to the Hungarian public administration, especially when it comes to handling the crisis, but I expect that this reform path is temporary and within 4 -5 years, certain competencies will be decentralized again in order to better en-able the governing center to formulate long-term policies instead of every-day issue management.
